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Abstract Every state entering the Union in the United States since 1803
received land grants from the federal government for the support
of their public schools. Inherent in this federal grant is the
ﬁduciary duty to prudently and effectively manage trust assets
for the beneﬁciary, their school systems. This paper addresses
the question of whether managers of trust lands are meeting their
ﬁduciary responsibilities of ‘‘maximum economic beneﬁt’’ for
their beneﬁciaries. Realized market value-based economic
returns from grazing lease revenues and capital appreciation for
all twenty-three counties in Wyoming are compared with returns
that may have been generated from alternative investment policy
alternatives. Market values and capital appreciation for school
trust lands in Wyoming are estimated from hedonic models
formulated from ranch sales data and grazing revenue data.
Introduction
Every state entering the Union in the United States since 1803 received land grants
from the federal government for the support of public schools. In Wyoming,
although a portion of the surface rights for ‘‘School Trust Lands’’ has been sold
over time, the trust still manages in excess of 4.2 million acres of mineral estate
and 3.5 million acres of surface estate from the original land grant. These lands
and the permanent fund, which they have generated, are governed under Article
18 of the Wyoming Constitution and are reserved for the sole beneﬁt of the
designated beneﬁciaries. These beneﬁciaries are the common (public) schools and
certain other designated public institutions in Wyoming. These are a unique form
of public lands because of restrictions and the ﬁduciary responsibilities associated
with the management of these lands.
The management of school trust land has been a contentious political topic for
many years and will likely remain so. Numerous arguments can and have been
made for and against current management policy that has focused on agricultural346  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
grazing and mineral leases. This focus may be based on the importance of
agricultural and natural resource industries to Wyoming’s economy, the viability
of the agricultural industry and/or the lack of other income producing alternatives.
Rather than focusing on the political nature of the topic, the objective of this study
is to estimate realized returns on surface rights being generated by trust lands
through mineral and grazing leases. These realized rates of return are then
compared to alternative investment returns that could be generated if the lands
were sold and the proceeds were reinvested in accordance with state law. Based
on this comparison, school trust lands will be assessed to determine if they are
being managed in order to maximize the economic beneﬁt to the trusts
beneﬁciaries, the state school system.1 Alternative strategies are also discussed,
which are to increase grazing lease fees or adopting a variable fee system where
grazing rates are based on market values of leased lands.
Because of the difference in scenic and recreational value of land between Teton
County (Jackson Hole and Teton and Yellowstone National Parks) and the
remainder of the state, the valuation of Wyoming school trust lands was
operationalized using two multiple regression, hedonic models. One model
estimates the value of the trust land in Teton County, while another estimates
values of trust lands in the remainder of the state.2 The state model focuses on
characteristics that describe the productivity, as well as the scenic and recreational
value of the land. The Teton County model, on the other hand, focuses on
characteristics that capture scenic and recreational value. Based on estimated land
values from both models, returns from the current policy involving grazing leases
and capital gains are compared with the most likely alternative scenario that
assumes the land was sold and the proceeds were reinvested in long-term U.S.
Treasury securities.3
Based on the premise that higher rates of return, given equal or lower risk
investments, more adequately fulﬁlls the trustee’s ﬁduciary obligation of
maximizing economic returns, current returns on land market values are compared
with returns for the most likely alternative management policy of selling select
parcels of trust land and investing the proceeds in the permanent trust fund. The
alternative is consistent with Wyoming statutes. The sale and reinvestment of
proceeds may offer additional beneﬁts since, once sold to private entities, the land
is taxable, thus increasing the county’s tax base. The sale of trust land would also
enhance the diversity of trust assets and may reduce the volatility of the total trust
value.4
 Background and History
The U.S. Congress 1890 Act of Admission, which formally granted Wyoming
statehood, states: ‘‘sections sixteen and thirty-six of each township were to be
reserved for the beneﬁt of the public school system. In the event these sections
had already been disposed of by the U.S. Congress, equivalent were to beA Relationship of Trust  347
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substituted in lieu.’’ This act reafﬁrmed a similar land grant made by the Organic
Act of 1868, which established a temporary government for the territory of
Wyoming. The land grant made to Wyoming was similar to the land grants made
to each new state since 1803.5 Following the initial land grant, in accordance with
section 7 of the Act of Admission, approximately, 5% of the newly granted land
was sold and the sales proceeds were used to establish a permanent school fund.
In order to protect the beneﬁciaries, should additional tracts of land be sold,
section 5 of the Act of Admission required all sales be at public auction and
required that the proceeds be deposited in a permanent trust fund. Section 5 of
the Act of Admission states that only the interest generated by the permanent trust
fund can be distributed to support the beneﬁciaries, thus protecting the trust’s
corpus from being depleted, while providing a perpetual source of funding. The
permanent trust fund established by this Act is still in existence and provides a
signiﬁcant source of funding for the beneﬁciaries, the public school systems.
According to the 2001 Annual Report from the Ofﬁce of State Lands and
Investments (OSLI) the original land grants were approximately 4.2 million acres
spread evenly across the state. Since that time, a portion of the state trust land
has been disposed of contributing to the size of the permanent trust fund. Current
total assets contained in three different categories of the State Land Trust are:
3.5 million acres of surface estate, 4.2 million acres of mineral estate, and
approximately $986 million invested in ﬁnancial assets (Wyoming OSLI, 2001).
It has not been uncommon for states to dispose of land received from federal land
grants as their needs have changed. Currently only twenty-two states manage trust
lands, which total approximately 135 million acres.6
Despite the sizable land grant, only broad management guidelines were
established, leaving substantial management discretion to the state. This
management responsibility was endowed by Article 18, §3 of the Constitution of
the State of Wyoming to the Board of Land Commissioners.7 This article gives
the Board the discretion over control, leasing and disposal of state trust land,
subject to the limitation that the sale of lands must be at public auction. Section
5, of the Act of Admission provides some direction as to how the land can be
managed by stating that the land can be leased for mineral, grazing, agricultural,
or other purposes so long as the term of the agricultural and grazing leases do
not exceed ten years. This provides for the land to be used in a manor that provides
a stream of revenue, without having to dispose of the trust land. The ﬂexibility
afforded by the broad management guidelines has resulted in a combination of
uses that include leases for grazing, oil and gas, other mineral leases and timber
sales, but also leaves open the option of land sales when it is in the best interest
of the beneﬁciary.8
From Exhibit 1, it is apparent that the state trust land’s primary revenue generating
source is from grazing and mineral leases. Although grazing leases are the most
common use, they generate only a small portion of the total income. On the other348  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
Exhibit 1  State Land Revenue by Source FY–2001
Revenue Source Revenue ($) Acres Leaseda Acres Under Prod.a
Oil & Gas 59,228,138 1,681,228 347,230
Coal 643,494 115,247 4,640
Grazing & Crop Share 3,744,329 3,540,857 3,540,857
Sodium, Trona, Metallic &
Non-Metallic Rocks and
Minerals 4,129,412 164,826 15,391
Timber Sales 432,196 — —
Real Estate Sales 451,289 — —
Easements 3,751,491 — —
Bentonite 256,601 40,141 4,021
Sand and Gravel 130,689 2,950 814
Temporary Use Permits 236,638 — —
Special Use Leases 282,907 28,581 —
Surface Damages 560,864 — —
Uranium & Misc. Minerals 207,684 940 940
Other Fees & Payments 2,457,061 — —
Liquidated Damages 10,000 — —
Total Revenue 76,522,793 5,574,769 3,913,893
Notes:
aTotal leased acres is greater than the total amount of state trust land due to the possibility of
multiple use.
Source: Ofﬁce of State Lands and Investments 2001 Annual Report.
hand, oil, gas and mineral leases generate more than 75% of the total trust land
revenue while accounting for only a small portion of the total acres leased.
Since Wyoming is semiarid, has a deeply rooted agricultural tradition and is
sparsely populated, grazing and mineral leases have historically been two of the
few productive uses of the trust land. In addition to providing a stream of income
for the trust beneﬁciaries, grazing and mineral leases provide additional beneﬁts
to the state. Even though the trust land is to be managed solely for the
beneﬁciaries, it is common for other parties to derive some residual beneﬁts. Under
current management policy, oil and mineral leases beneﬁt the state through the
creation of jobs and the generation of taxes. Grazing leases enhance the viability
of agricultural concerns, and the public beneﬁts from open space that may be used
for recreational pursuits.A Relationship of Trust  349
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Although management guidelines for trust lands are vague, the Wyoming
Constitution (§ 36-5-105) requires that ‘‘all state lands leased by the state board
of land commissioners, for grazing and other agricultural purposes shall be leased
in such a manner and to such parties as shall insure to the greatest beneﬁt to the
state trust beneﬁciaries.’’Although, under the current management policy revenues
generated for trust beneﬁciaries are readily observable, it has been difﬁcult to
estimate market value realized rates of return because of the lack of dependable
trust land market values. This study provides the mechanism for estimating market
values using hedonic modeling.
The option to sell trust land, however, is limited by the Wyoming Constitution
(§ 36-9-101), which states ‘‘the board shall sell such subdivisions as it shall deem
for the best interests of the state land trust. The board shall not sell state land
unless the board ﬁnds that the proceeds from the sale are protected from
inﬂationary effect and the proceeds earn a signiﬁcantly higher rate of return than
can be realized through retention of the surface estate.’’ The public’s
misunderstanding of the purpose of trust lands further complicates the sale of
surface rights. Even though the constitution clearly states the trust land is to be
managed for the beneﬁt of the beneﬁciaries, many view trust land as public land
that should be managed as such.
According to the 2001 Annual Report published by the Ofﬁce of State Lands and
Investments: ‘‘... these lands are known as ‘state’ lands. While ownership rests
with the state, the beneﬁts accrue solely to the beneﬁciaries who were named in
the grants.’’ Confusion results when these lands are perceived as ‘public’ lands,
much like federal lands whose primary mandates are to be managed for multiple-
use purposes. The conditions imposed when state lands were granted require that
the lands be managed for revenue purposes to beneﬁt public schools and other
institutions.
In a 1996 address to the State Land Task Force, former Wyoming Governor Jim
Geringer acknowledged the difference between the state trust land and public land
but explained why many view the land in an alternative light: ‘‘These are not state
lands or public lands in the sense of a State Park, but are viewed this way by
much of the public. When we look at the trust obligations it has its requirements.
But then there are the long time traditional users of the land—agriculture ...
Agricultural impacts on the beneﬁciaries in the sense of leasing surface acreage
have been long-standing. It is part of our culture. In fact, agricultural producers
feel they have an inherent right to continue to use these lands, which have been
demonstrated to possess a permit value. Deeded lands that have been transferred
with accompanying state leases have been shown to possess permit values.’’9
Although the state constitution requires that school trust land be managed for the
sole beneﬁt of the trust’s beneﬁciaries, Governor Geringer acknowledged that other
factors have been given consideration in their management. Given that state trust
land grazing leases signiﬁcantly increase market values of leaseholders’ ranches350  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
and farms, it follows that lease rates are likely priced below market rates and are
expected to remain so in the future. Therefore, current lease rates in essence
provide subsidies to leaseholders at the beneﬁciary’s expense.10 As a result of the
observed subsidy, it is apparent that current management policy does not provide
the maximum beneﬁt to trust beneﬁciaries.11
In addition to other factors, the surge in real estate prices due to farms and ranches
being subdivided and sold for recreational rather than agricultural purposes during
the previous decade, particularly in Teton County, warrants the consideration of
selected land parcels to be sold.
 Data and Models
Under current management policy, trust land returns on surface rights are
generated from grazing revenues and appreciation of surface right values. Annual
grazing revenues were obtained from the State of Wyoming and current estimated
market values were determined using hedonic MRA models.
Two hedonic models are used to estimate trust land fair market values. The state
model, using statewide ranch sales, estimates values of trust lands throughout the
state except for Teton County. The second hedonic model estimates the value of
state school trust lands in Teton County.
In both models, the dependent variable is deﬁned as the sale price per acre. The
linear models force the intercept through the origin, since it is unreasonable to
assume a given parcel of land can be worth more or less than zero when no acreage
exists and all other attributes are zero.12
The hedonic approach, as applied, estimates values for school trust parcels
assuming they are integral parts of operating farms or ranches. Since many farms
or ranches rely on public leases to provide economy of scale and economic
viability for their operations, the possibility of trust lands being unavailable
and the possibility of not renewing leases would provide individual ranchers’
incentives to negotiate sales prices similar to estimated values. Since sections 16
and 36 in each township were designated, as school trust lands, it is reasonable
to assume that each school section’s value is similar in value to adjacent private
ranch lands with similar attributes. However, it is likely that these leases and their
market values are higher as integral parts of operating farms and ranches than to
external investors. The difference in value between existing lessees and external
investors/bidders results from the preferred right of renewal, the fact that some
states are fence-out states, a possible access problems, and the fact that much of
the trust land is located within the boundaries of existing farms and ranches. From
the external investor’s viewpoint, trust lands may be overpriced. Thus, due to the
structural factors that affect the demand for school trust lands, this study suggests
that school and trustees seek to change the method by which land is sold.
Currently, school trust lands are required to be sold at public auction.13A Relationship of Trust  351
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State Model
The statewide model was formulated using 1,617 arms-length ranch/farm sales
occurring between January 1989 and December 2001. The data was subsequently
trimmed to 1,372 sales to ensure the model was representative of a typical ranch/
farm sale in the state. Sales involving less than 100 acres were omitted as ranches/
farms of this size are typically hobby ranches/farms and are generally not large
enough to sustain a viable agricultural operation. Additionally, sales including
leased or deeded land outside of Wyoming were also excluded, as well as sales
with incomplete data. The ﬁnal data set had a mean sale price of $600,500 and
an average of 3,864 deeded acres with 1,968 deeded animal unit months (AUM).14
The state model uses explanatory, independent variables to represent the physical,
productive and esthetic characteristics that inﬂuence land values. These include,
size, location, scenic/recreational value, the productive capacity of the land, sale
date, the condition of sale and presence of leased lands. A description of the
speciﬁc variables can be found in the Exhibit 2.15
The date of ranch sales during the period of study is controlled by applying the
Bryan and Colwell (1982) methodology.16 This method deﬁnes each sale date as
a linear combination of the end points of the half-year period in which the sale
occurs.17 Ranch sale prices were generally rising during the study period.18
To control for productive capacity, the variable QUALITY, the ratio of deeded
AUMs to deeded acres (DAUMs/DACRES), was included and the log of deeded
acres (LDACRE) is used to control for the expected nonlinear relationship
(economy of scale) between sale price per acre and the size of the farm or ranch,
as deﬁned by deeded acres.
Although the valuation of state trust land would not have grazing leases connected
to the sale, per say, in formulating both valuation models, it is important to
incorporate the type and characteristics of grazing leases associated with each farm
and ranch sale since farms and ranches with leases may sell at a premium relative
to those without leases.19 Once both models are formulated, this allows value
estimates for ranches and farms with or without grazing leases. Both models are
then used to estimate the value of deﬁned state trust lands.
Typically, grazing leases are based on forage rather than acreage as the amount
of forage can vary from year to year and from region to region. The amount of
forage available on both deeded and leased land is measured by the number of
deeded and leased animal unit months (AUMs). AUMs are the standard measure
of forage for deeded, as well as federal, state and private leases.20
In 1993, a study conducted by the USDA/USDI of three western states, including
Wyoming, classiﬁed regionalized forage values into clustered intrastate allotments
based on twenty-one different ecoregions (see Exhibit 3). The ecoregions are used
to differentiate the region studied based on differences in soil, vegetation, land
form, climate and use. Using the six ecoregions found in Wyoming (ECO3, ECO4,352  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
Exhibit 2  Description of Independent Variables: State-Wide Data
Category Variables Description
Sale Price SALEP Sale price per deeded acre
Real Property RPROP Estimated dollar value of real property
improvements
RACRE Real property per acre
Grazing Leases BLM15AUM Section 15 BLM grazing lease AUMs
BLM3AUM Section 3 BLM grazing lease AUMs
STATEAUM State grazing lease AUMs
FORSTAUM Forest Service grazing lease AUMs
PRVTAUM Private grazing lease AUMs
Land Quality QUALITY The ratio of deeded AUMs (DAUMs) per acre;
designed to measure the productivity of the land
Scenic Value FAIR Dummy variable for ranches with little or no scenic
and/or recreational value
AVERAGE Dummy variable for ranches with average scenic
and/or recreational value
GOOD Dummy variable for ranches with above average
scenic and/or recreational value
EXCELLENT Dummy variable for ranches with a high degree of
scenic and/or recreational value
Location ECO3, ECO4, ECO5,
ECO7, ECO8 and
ECO9
Dummy variables representing location based on
ecoregion
Type of Sale ARMS LENGTH Sales involving arms-length transactions
AUCTION Sales by auction
STRESS Sales where landowner is forced to sell
FORECLOSE Sales due to foreclosure by a creditor
Date of Sale B89S1 to B02S1 Time-weighted variables representing the
beginning of the semi-annual periods from 1989
to 2002
ECO5, ECO7, ECO8 and ECO9), a dummy variable was set up to control for the
location within the state.21
Scenic and recreational attributes may have signiﬁcant inﬂuences on farm and
ranch values as they provide opportunities for multiple use rather than productive
agricultural use only. The relative scenic and recreational value of each farm and
ranch was subjectively assessed and assigned one of four ratings: FAIR,
AVERAGE, GOOD or EXCELLENT.22
A dummy variable was also used to control for type of sale. Most sales were
categorized as ARMS LENGTH transitions, but some sales transactions involvedA Relationship of Trust  353
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Exhibit 3  Map of Ecoregions
Source: USDA/USDI, 1993.
AUCTION, STRESS or FORECLOSURE sales. It was important to include type
of sale in the model as state statutes require trust land to be sold at public auction.
Teton County Model
The model used to estimate land values in Teton County is similar to the state
model, but only includes lands within Teton County. This model, formulated by
Spahr and Sunderman (1999), focuses more extensively on the scenic and
recreation attributes rather than the land’s productivity. These attributes include
the number of deeded acres, the location within Teton County, the view of the
Teton Mountains and especially Teton Peak,23 the presence of streams and the
topography of the land. A complete description of each variable can be found in
the Exhibit 4.24
Due to the limited availability of private land in Teton County, there were no
directly comparable sales for some of the trust land in the county.25 Two full354  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
Exhibit 4  Description of Independent Variables: Teton County Data
Category Variables Description
Sale Price SPRICE Sale price
PRICE/ACRE Sale price per deeded acre
Real Property RPROP Estimated dollar value of real property
improvements
RACRE Real property per acre
Size ACRES Size in acres
Location L31, L32, L41, L42, L51, L52,
L61, L62, L91 and L92
Dummy variables representing location
Vegetation HAY Hay ﬁelds
GRAZE Grazing land
TREES Some trees
MATURE Mature vegetation (lots of trees)
Topography FLAT
ROLLING
SLOPE Slightly sloped or a combination of
rolling and sloped
STEEP Steeply sloped
Water NONE No streams or footage on the Snake
River
STREAMS Containing or adjacent to running
streams
SNAKE Footage on the Snake River
Scenic Value FAIR No view of the Tetons; less than
average, perhaps effected by manmade
effects
AVERAGE Poor Teton view/Average view
GOOD Teton view, plus other attributes
EXCELLENT Full Teton view; trees/water
Date of Sale B89, B90, B91, B92, B93,
B94, B95, B96, B97 and B98
Time-weighted variable for the beginning
of listed year
Note: The source is Spahr and Sunderman (1999).
sections of state trust land are located within the boundaries of the Bridger Teton
National Forest. Consequently, they do not fall into one of the Multiple Listing
Areas. In an effort to make the model conservative, yet reasonable, an average of
the price per acre across the county was used for these two sections. This is a
very conservative assessment of the land’s value as these sections are some of the
most attractively located parcels with a high degree of privacy. They are also
surrounded by national park land and do not face the possibility of nearby
development.26A Relationship of Trust  355
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 Empirical Results
State Model
The results from the analysis of the statewide model can be found in Exhibit 5.
The resulting model had an adjusted R2 of .9022.
As expected, the scenic and recreational value is very important. Parcels with
AVERAGE, GOOD and EXCELLENT ratings carry $96.70, $259.26 and $283.39
per acre premiums, respectively, when compared to land with a rating of POOR.
Likewise, the location within the state is also signiﬁcant. Each ecoregion has a
negative coefﬁcient when compared to ECO7. Typically, land in ECO3, ECO4,
ECO5, ECO8 and ECO9 sold for $231.13, $158.36, $168.86, $144.85 and $115.41
less per acre, respectively. Additionally, farms and ranches sold at public auction
for $45.06 per acre less than arms-length ranch sales.27 The presence of BLM3
and BLM15 leases were not signiﬁcant, but the presence of state trust grazing
leases was both signiﬁcant and positive. The observation that grazing leases
increase farm or ranch values is an indication that school trust grazing lease rates
are likely below market levels where the difference is capitalized into farm and
ranch prices.
Teton County Model
The Teton County model results are found in Exhibit 6. This model has an
adjusted R2 of .9644.28
As expected, the type of vegetation present and the topography of the land had a
signiﬁcant impact on land values in Teton County. Parcels with HAY, TREES and
MATURE sold at $4,267, $8,251 and $12,727 per acre premiums respectively,
when compared to GRAZE. Likewise, parcels with an AVERAGE, GOOD or
EXCELLENT view of the Teton Mountains typically sold at $5,607, $18,426 and
$18,730 per acre premiums, respectively, when compared to parcels with a FAIR
view. The presence of a stream adds $5,266 per acre when compared to land
without a stream, while footage along the Snake River carries a premium of only
$1,476 per acre. This was perhaps the most interesting result as one might expect
the footage on the Snake River to carry a larger premium than STREAM.29
However, the possibility of the land being in a ﬂood plane may explain this result.
 Valuation and Returns on Trust Lands
School trust land values in Wyoming were estimated by applying the two models
described above assuming that trust lands have values similar to adjacent deeded
lands. Based on estimated values, both the returns from current management
policy and the alternative investment returns that may have been generated if the356  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
Exhibit 5  State of Wyoming Data
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Exhibit 5  (continued)
State of Wyoming Data














Notes: The dependent variable is Price Per Acre. The number of observations is 1,372. The
adjusted R2 is .9022.
lands were sold are calculated. The alternative investment returns were calculated
using current and historical average 20-year Treasury bond rates to show the
amount of income that may have been generated given land proceeds had been
reinvested. The current 20-year Treasury bond yield results in the most
conservative estimate of investment income as interest rates are near their lowest
level in several decades. However, the average 20-year Treasury bond yield will
likely provide a more reasonable estimate of future income, as yields are unlikely
to remain at the currently low levels. These returns are compared to investment
returns generated from the current management policy, which is to continue
leasing the land for grazing purposes.30
Based on the model results, the average value of land across the state (excluding
Teton County) was $873 per acre, while the average price per acre in Teton County
is $108,550. The 3.6 million acres of trust land from across the state are valued
at over $3.1 billion, while the 3,358 acres of trust land in Teton County are valued
at more than $386 million. The results for the entire state are shown, by county,
in Columns four and ﬁve of Exhibit 7.
As seen in Exhibit 8, assuming sales proceeds were invested to earn a current 20-
year Treasury yield of 4.83%, the sale of trust land across the state would generate
$150 million in investment income each year; whereas the sale of trust land in358  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
Exhibit 6  Teton County Model
Variable Parameter Estimate t-Statistic










































































































12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
Albany 213,135 56,085 0.26 187,678,925 881 226,583 0.12 10,322,341 10,095,757 329,764,204 129,838,008
Big Horn 71,883 10,817 0.15 64,462,790 897 43,701 0.07 3,545,453 3,501,753 113,265,358 43,793,633
Campbell 186,077 55,495 0.30 156,678,803 842 224,200 0.14 8,617,334 8,393,134 275,294,952 109,215,737
Carbon 318,747 72,355 0.23 277,744,639 871 292,314 0.11 15,275,955 14,983,641 488,015,581 191,135,196
Converse 253,434 71,920 0.28 224,327,011 885 290,557 0.13 12,337,986 12,047,429 394,157,299 155,655,333
Crook 116,628 40,157 0.34 103,425,179 887 162,234 0.16 5,688,385 5,526,151 181,724,836 72,429,105
Fremont 254,139 50,833 0.20 224,553,292 884 205,365 0.09 12,350,431 12,145,066 394,554,890 153,802,489
Goshen 84,642 30,152 0.36 63,381,271 749 121,814 0.19 3,485,970 3,364,156 111,365,058 44,912,677
Hot Springs 82,974 19,254 0.23 71,859,811 866 77,786 0.11 3,952,290 3,874,503 126,262,411 49,502,390
Johnson 219,215 56,056 0.26 206,613,184 943 226,466 0.11 11,363,725 11,137,259 363,032,941 142,396,698
Laramie 148,123 48,367 0.33 112,779,322 761 195,403 0.17 6,202,863 6,007,460 198,160,680 79,414,703
Lincoln 107,036 26,473 0.25 98,394,041 919 106,951 0.11 5,411,672 5,304,721 172,884,796 67,791,541
Natrona 389,955 85,219 0.22 322,788,219 828 344,285 0.11 17,753,352 17,409,067 567,160,112 222,240,092
Niobrara 162,887 56,672 0.35 133,111,845 817 228,955 0.17 7,321,151 7,092,197 233,886,259 93,692,646




























Exhibit 7  (continued)



























Platte 123,419 36,366 0.29 104,144,203 844 146,919 0.14 5,727,931 5,581,013 182,988,208 72,546,032
Sheridan 115,939 42,414 0.37 125,841,800 1,085 171,353 0.14 6,921,299 6,749,946 221,112,313 87,515,216
Sublette 112,781 28,248 0.25 105,887,174 939 114,122 0.11 5,823,795 5,709,673 186,050,722 72,931,266
Sweetwater 179,344 19,944 0.11 141,297,181 788 80,574 0.06 7,771,345 7,690,771 248,268,433 95,634,359
Uinta 49,159 10,555 0.21 41,732,419 849 42,642 0.10 2,295,283 2,252,641 73,326,603 28,688,870
Washakie 100,105 21,313 0.21 89,983,015 899 86,105 0.10 4,949,066 4,862,961 158,106,070 61,721,337
Weston 113,652 29,720 0.26 94,784,720 834 120,069 0.13 5,213,160 5,093,091 166,542,982 65,705,450
State 3,558,377 911,039 0.26 3,107,337,192 873 3,680,598 0.12 170,903,546 167,222,948 5,459,795,640 2,148,018,277
Teton* 3,558.2 1,290 0.36 386,242,507 108,550 5,212 0.001 21,243,338 21,238,126 678,653,466 1,173,572,734
Notes:
aSource: Ofﬁce of State Land & Investments.
bEstimate of market value for Teton County is in 1997 rather that 2002, as more recent data was not available.













































Exhibit 8  Estimated Trust Land Income and Value
Assumed ROR
Estimate of Annual Income
State ($) Teton County ($) Total ($)
Estimate of Annual Income Foregone
State ($) Teton County ($) Total ($)
Grazing Lease Income 3,680,598 5,212 3,685,810 — — —
4.83%a 150,084,386 18,655,513 168,739,899 146,403,788 18,650,301 165,054,089
6.76%b 210,055,994 26,109,993 236,165,987 206,375,396 26,104,781 232,480,177
8.05%c 250,140,644 31,090,522 281,231,166 246,460,046 31,085,310 277,545,356
Notes:
aThe current 20-year Treasury bond yield A/O December 31, 2002.
bThe average 20-year Treasury bond yield from January 1989 to December 2002.
cThe average 20-year Treasury bond yield from January 1981 to December 2002 (the longest 20-year Treasury yield available).362  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
Teton County would generate approximately $18.6 million annually. If the
proceeds were reinvested assuming the less conservative average 20-year Treasury
rate of 6.76%, the state and Teton County proceeds would generate approximately
$210 million and $26.1 million annually. Despite current 20-year Treasury yields
being near historic lows, the sale of trust land and subsequent reinvestment of the
proceeds would increase the annual investment income by $146.4 million and
$18.6 million on the state and Teton County trust land, respectively, as compared
to the current revenues being generated by trust land from grazing leases. Under
the current management policy, grazing leases have increased from $1.65 per
AUM in 1981 to $4.04 in 2003, an annualized growth rate of 4.15%. They are
generating only $3.7 million (0.12% yield) across the state and $5,212 (0.001%
yield) on the trust land in Teton County (Exhibit 7, Columns 6 and 7).31
Given a minimal level of income generated from surface grazing leases, the
majority of total returns on trust lands results from land appreciation, which varies
from year to year based on economic conditions within the state. From 1989 to
2001, ranch land appreciated, on average, 4% each year, but included in this time
period were ﬁve years where land values declined. Likewise, real estate values
were also increasing in Teton County over the same period, but at a much greater
rate, on average 12% annually. Using the expected cash ﬂows from the two
investment alternatives over the next thirty years, the net present value (NPV) of
each alternative was calculated to determine which alternative would generate the
greatest beneﬁt for the trust’s beneﬁciaries.32 The NPV of the sale and
reinvestment alternative is $5.46 billion, while the NPV of holding land for
grazing purposes is $2.15 billion. A similar analysis of Teton County shows the
NPV of the sale and investment option is approximately $678 million while the
NPV of holding the land for grazing purposes is $1.17 billion (see Exhibit 7,
Columns 10, 11 and 12). Not only would the sale and subsequent investment of
the trust land across the state result in a signiﬁcantly higher NPV, but the level
of current income available to the beneﬁciaries would also increase by $167
million per year based on an investment return of only 5.5% (see Exhibit 7,
Column 9). Conversely, the NPV of holding the land in Teton County is higher
due to the assumption that the rapid rate of appreciation in the area will continue.
This result, however, is based on the average annual appreciation rate of 10%,
which may not be sustainable for an extended period of time. Should the
appreciation rate slow to 8% (approximately twice the state average), the NPV of
the two alternatives would be approximately equivalent.
 Conclusion
The analysis indicates that current management policy for Wyoming school trust
lands fails to fulﬁll the ﬁduciary responsibility of maximizing beneﬁts for the
beneﬁciary, the public schools of Wyoming. Currently and historically,
management policy involved predominately the leasing of trust lands for grazing
and agricultural use. This policy in the past may have represented the best use ofA Relationship of Trust  363
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the school trust land; however, this policy appears to have failed to evolve with
changing market values and conditions. A surge in real estate prices during the
previous decade has reduced market value yields on trust lands, and as a result,
better management policies may have also evolved. A better management policy
containing additional management alternatives may involve raising lease rates,
setting variable lease rates depending on the value of the individual parcel of trust
land and/or selling selected parcels of the trust lands and reinvesting the proceeds
in the permanent trust fund. Even though the sale of trust land would provide
signiﬁcantly more income (cash ﬂows) for the trust’s beneﬁciaries, it would not
be feasible or prudent to sell all of the land, particularly in a short period of time.
Such a move could not only drive down real estate prices, but could be in violation
of state law as it may require the termination of existing grazing leases.33 Also,
due to Wyoming statutes requiring that school trust lands be sold at public auction,
and the lack of access to some land parcels and lack of potential bidders, sale
prices may be lower than estimated above.34 For this reason, sales of trust lands
should use either a public auction that includes a non-truncated bidding process
containing minimum bids or that lawmakers attempt to change the state’s statutes
to allow negotiated bidding. Models, such as those developed above, may be used
to estimate individual trust land parcel values for setting minimum acceptable bids.
Due to the far-reaching consequences of trust land policies, other factors should
be considered such as public access, the dependence of local ranchers on grazing
leases and the sanctity of the trust land. Although this study aims not to examine
the political nature of trust land policy, these issues must be given consideration
in the context of the ‘‘maximum beneﬁt’’ ﬁduciary responsibility. Alternative
management policies must consider both current and future requirements of the
beneﬁciary. While the sale of the trust land may increase current revenues, it cuts
off growth opportunities from land appreciation and may, in the long run, provide
lower future returns to the beneﬁciary. Conversely, current management policy
provides an opportunity for land appreciation, but is accomplished at the expense
of current cash receipts.35 In Wyoming, as well as for many other western states,
current school funding requirements are critical. Current Wyoming Governor
Freudenthal has clariﬁed that court-mandated capital construction cost for the
public school systems are currently estimated between $500 million to $1.3 billion
(Wyoming Tribune-Eagle). Instead of considering the suggested alternative
management strategy for school trust lands that would help fund such gaps, he
has opted to ﬁrst look to increasing property taxes.
The sale of selected trust land parcels may create a ﬁnancial strain on existing
leaseholders who may depend on state lands for their operation’s viability and
would almost certainly feel required to bid on the land. However, those parcels
that have limited scenic and/or recreational attributes where their values are
determined mainly by productivity may not be the prime candidates for sale and
reinvestment.36 Returns on these non-scenic lands may already be sufﬁciently high
as to not warrant their sale. Trust lands that possess scenic and/or recreational
value, however, may be better candidates for sale; however, these sales may limit364  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
public access. Although the land is not designated for public access, it has
historically been available for multiple use and would be considered a loss by the
general public.
To mitigate such issues, the sale of carefully selected sections could minimize
impacts of trust land sales and provide the state school system with additional
revenues. However, this approach may not result in the sale of a signiﬁcant portion
of trust land, and would have less impact on agribusiness in Wyoming.
The sale of sections that are land locked or otherwise inaccessible to the public,
would not further limit public access.37 When a parcel is land locked, leaseholders
in essence gain all of the beneﬁts normally afforded a landowner, thus current
grazing fees may under compensate the school system and not reﬂect the true
intrinsic value of the leased property. Given this situation, it may be appropriate
to consider raising lease rates or establishing a system of variable lease rates
depending on the value of the individual lease parcel.
Many of the high value trust lands are located in close proximity to National
Forests, National Parks, recreation areas, lakes, etc. In areas frequented by
recreationists, these lands may be redesignated by the state for recreation use only,
since grazing fees represent a miniscule return on investment.38 Alternatively, the
state or federal governments may purchase these lands to add to state or national
parks or national forests, since their highest and best use is undoubtedly recreation.
This would still leave a substantial portion of trust land available for grazing, thus
having minimal impact on agribusiness. Sale of some school trust land also would
increase local property taxes since there would be more land on the tax roles.39
Because trust lands in Teton County have appreciated at the highest rate in recent
years, lease revenue on these lands are providing a miniscule beneﬁts to the public
school system, yet the greatest beneﬁts are derived by a select group of
leaseholders. It would almost certainly be in the best interest of the beneﬁciary to
sell these lands when current grazing leases expire as this appreciation rate is
likely unsustainable. With the value of trust lands in Teton County approaching
$400 million, reinvesting the proceeds would generate between $18 and $28
million each year assuming a 4.5% to 7% return on investment.
One ﬁnal point for consideration is the comparison of the NPV of management
options. A comparison of the NPV of the trust land given current management
policy relative to the NPV of the sale/reinvestment alternative is startling; where
the sale and reinvestment alternative has a NPV $3.5 billion greater than current
policy. Teton County, on the other hand, has a greater NPV when holding the
land, assuming the past 10% annual appreciation rate continues. However, as
previously mentioned, it is doubtful that this appreciation rate can continue. If an
appreciation rate of 8% (approximately twice the state average) is assumed, the
sale and reinvestment alternative is preferable.A Relationship of Trust  365
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 Endnotes
1 The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to current policy and suggest possible
alternative policy for the management of school trust lands. However, the hedonic
approach developed could be applied to each individual school parcel to estimate each
parcel’s unique value and rate of return. If adopted as management policy, this model
could be used to set variable lease rates based on individual parcel values. A similar
hedonic approach is currently being used to determine assessed values for residential
real estate in Wyoming and could be used in a similar manner for valuing each parcel,
estimating market-based returns and lease rate determination for each individual parcel
of school trust land.
2 It was necessary to use two separate models as real estate values in Teton County are
inﬂated, in relation to the remainder of the state, due to the scenic and recreational value
of land in close proximity to Grand Teton National Park and Yellowstone National Park.
3 The differences in risk between U.S. Treasuries and returns on leased school trust lands
are considered; however, the returns on the most likely investment that proceeds from
the sale of school trust lands would be reinvested in are compared. This is U.S.
Treasuries. Given that U.S. Treasuries stochastically dominate (ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance) existing lease returns, this would seem to be sufﬁcient incentive for
considering the sale and reinvestment alternative.
4 Due to the Wyoming’s dependence on natural resources, the economy tends to be very
cyclical and real estate prices are often positively correlated with the state’s economy.
Therefore, the sale of trust land and subsequent investment in assets with a low degree
of correlation could reduce the volatility of the trust’s principal.
5 These lands were a gift, but with strings attached. They were part of an agreement,
where each state would not tax federal lands within in its borders if the school trust
lands were granted (NASBE, 1997).
6 The states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming
(Macke, 2002).
7 The Board of Land Commissioners includes the Governor, the Secretary of State, the
State Treasurer, the State Auditor and the Superintendent of Public Instruction.
8 Section 36-9-101 of the Wyoming Statutes states ‘‘the board of land commissioners may
at any time direct the sale of state lands subject to any lease thereof ... . The board shall
sell such subdivisions as it shall deem for the best interests of the land trust. The board
shall not sell state land unless the board ﬁnds that the proceeds from the sales are
protected from inﬂationary effects and the proceeds will earn a signiﬁcantly higher rate
of return than can be realized through retention of the surface estate and if the board
ﬁnds that the sale will: (i) Make state lands more manageable where the lands are not
otherwise manageable; (ii) Meet a speciﬁc need of a school or community for land; (iii)
Better meet multiple use objectives of the beneﬁciaries of the trust; or (iv) Realize a
clear long-term beneﬁt to the trust which substantially exceeds the present and probable
future beneﬁt from continued ownership.’’
9 This was also the conclusion of Spahr and Sunderman (1995), where they suggest that
permit values on grazing leases increase the market value of ranches due to the long
term nature of the leases and the below market rate lease rate.366  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
10 Section 36-5-105 of the Wyoming Constitution states: ‘‘An applicant who is the holder
of an expiring lease, and is qualiﬁed under the provisions of § 36-5-101, shall have a
preferred right to renew such a lease by meeting the highest bid offered which is based
on the fair market value, using the formula developed by the board pursuant to § 36-5-
101(b), for the same or similar use of the land.’’
11 For further discussion, see Sunderman, Spahr and Kunkle (2002).
12 Little sensitivity of the models was found with respect to allowing an intercept or forcing
it through zero. Granted, econometric texts would suggest allowing an intercept and not
forcing the intercept through zero if zero is out of the data range. However, given the
objective of the hedonic model to provide the best estimate of market value, and the
deduction that an intercept of zero is not out of the data range, the intercept was
depressed. An observation with no attributes (all independent variables are zero)
reasonably would result in zero market value.
13 Public auctions result in lower prices for sales of deeded properties as compared to
conventional arms-length sales because of the structural reasons discussed above. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume a similar case for trust lands. If school trust lands were sold
in a non-truncated bidding process with a minimum acceptable bid, prices may more
closely approximate estimated values.
14 An animal unit month is a standardized measure of forage necessary to sustain a mature
cow with calf, a horse or ﬁve sheep for one month (U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce,
1992).
15 It is important to note that actual sales of school trust lands are included in the data set
and since sections 16 and 36 were designated as school sections, the attributes of school
trust lands generally are very comparable to the attributes of the deeded ranch land
surrounding it. Thus, in no way should the valuation of school trust lands be considered
an out of sample estimation.
16 This approach was also applied by Sunderman and Spahr (1994), Spahr and Sunderman
(1995, 1998), Colwell, Munneke and Trefzger (1998) and Sunderman, Spahr, Birch and
Oster (2000).
17 Date of sale variables B(y), are proportionate weights. There is a date of sale variable
for each half-year in which sales occurred, with half years beginning on January and
July 1 for all years in the study. For example, if a sale occurred in September 1990,
B90S2 is 0.583, B91S1 is 0.417 and all other B(y) variables are zero. Since the sale
was closer to July 1, 1990 than to January 1, 1991, B90S2 is larger and given more
weight than B91S1. This approach allows the rate of change in prices to be different
for each half-year and allows for a monthly price continuum. The Bryan and Colwell
method (1982) may seem like overkill in this application, because when sales are
occurring over this long a period, calibrating to the speciﬁc month may seem
unnecessary; however, this approach is employed in this study.
18 The tendency for ranch price to rise over time has been shown in studies by Torell and
Fowler (1986), Thompson (1998) and Sunderman, Spahr, Birch and Oster (2000).
19 For example, see Sunderman and Spahr (1994).
20 In order to control for the presence, type and forage available from grazing leases,
variables were included to account for the number of AUMs available on each type of
lease. For example, private grazing leases (PRIVATEAUM), state leases (STATEAUM),
section 15 BLM leases (BLM15AUM) and section 3 BLM leases (BLM3AUM). Section
3 BLM leases generally consist of larger acreage or tracts of land that may represent anA Relationship of Trust  367
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interest in a grazing association or at least represent a larger scale lease. Section 15
BLM leases generally are those tracts that are interspersed among ranches’deeded acres.
Often, section 15 tracts are lands that were never homesteaded or purchased from the
federal government. These tracts usually have the least desirable terrain and usually
contain little water.
21 Ecoregion was selected to control for location rather than county as county lines
represent an arbitrary political boundary that is not inﬂuenced by the physical attributes
of the land.
22 Parcels with a FAIR rating would contain very little scenic and recreational value, while
parcels with a rating of EXCELLENT would possess very attractive scenic and
recreational attributes. Farms and ranches with EXCELLENT ratings may be located in
close proximity to lakes, have streams present, or be in or near mountains where hunting,
ﬁshing and other recreational activities are possible. The remaining ratings of AVERAGE
and GOOD are assigned to parcels with progressively improving features. Scenic and
recreational value ratings were accomplished with the assistance of Farm Credit Services
appraisers.
23 Although Teton County is very scenic as a whole, some areas provide a better view of
the Teton Mountains.
24 To account for the location, the sales within Teton County were classiﬁed by their
location within the following Multiple Listing Areas:
1. Teton Village
2. Racquet Club/Teton Pines
3. West of the Snake River and north of Wilson
4. West of the Snake River and south of Wilson
5. Skyline Ranch, north of Highway 22 to Sagebrush Drive and west of Spring Gulch
6. North of Jackson and south of Gros Ventre Junction
7. North of Gros Ventre Junction and Kelly and Moran
8. Town of Jackson
9. South of Jackson to the Snake River Bridge
10. South of Snake River Bridge to the county line
To better deﬁne the location within the county and account for land characteristics, areas
3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 were each divided into two parts.
25 A signiﬁcant portion of Teton County is either national forest or national park land.
26 The physical characteristics of the land was accounted for by adding dummy variables
for the view of the Teton Mountains (FAIR, AVERAGE, GOOD or EXCELLENT), the
type of vegetation present and the presence of water. The type of vegetation on each
parcel was categorized as grazing land (GRAZE), hay meadows (HAY), some trees
(TREES) or lots of trees (MATURE). Finally, the presence of water was included to
show no water (NONE), streams (STREAM) or footage along the Snake River (SNAKE).
27 It was noted that farms and ranches sold at public auction sell at a lower prices than
for comparable ranches sold through the arms-length, negotiation process. This is
perhaps due to market inefﬁciencies, the lack of market liquidity, the timing of sale,
land access problems and a number of other possible factors. Due to the difference
between public auction and negotiated sales prices, the ﬁndings indicate that public
auctions with minimum bids or possibly changing statutes to allow negotiated sales be
used for the sale of school trust lands.
28 The model also contains a zero-one dummy variable to account for the Crescent H sales
that were believed to have caused a structural shift in the market for rural real estate in368  Sunderman, Spahr and Runyan
the Jackson Hole valley. Setting the dummy variable to zero prior to the Crescent H
sale implies that the original sale of 1,300 acres and the subsequent sales of 35- to 40-
acre parcels from the subdivision of the Crescent H property had not occurred.
Subsequently, when the dummy variable is set to one to identify post Crescent H sales,
the impact on property values including both the original Crescent H sale and the
subsequent subdivision into 35- to 40-acre lots is observed. It is apparent that the dummy
variable, DUMMY, is very signiﬁcant with a coefﬁcient indicating that a premium of
approximately $88,000 per acre was paid for the Crescent H sales. For more detail, see
Spahr and Sunderman (1998).
29 Through the Jackson area, the Snake River it is a small stream during most of the year
and a ragging torrent in the spring. As a result, the river bed tends to be a very wide
area of debris and gravel within which the river meanders. In many locations, dikes are
built to keep the river from spreading further outside its already wide banks. Further,
land ownership extends to the ‘‘thread’’ of the river. As a result, land holdings may have
several acres of unusable land that has no other use than as a buffer from other properties
(Spahr and Sunderman, 1998).
30 The income derived from mineral leases was excluded from the analysis, as it is common
for the state to retain the mineral estate when the surface estate is sold. Therefore, only
grazing lease income would be lost due to the sale of surface rights.
31 These ﬁgures represent an estimate of grazing lease income based on the current rate
of $4.04 per AUM, but could vary from year to year due to the possibility of contested
grazing leases.
32 The NPV calculation was conditioned on the following assumptions:
1. Sale proceeds can be invested to earn 5.5% annually.
2. State land continues to appreciate 4.56% each year.
3. Teton County land continues to appreciate 10% each year.
4. The current Grazing rate of $4.04/AUM will continue to increase 4.15% each year.
5. A discount rate of 6%.
6. The calculation used the estimated cash ﬂows for the next thirty years with the land
being sold at that time for the FMV assuming the appropriate appreciation rate.
7. Trust land is sold in 640-acre parcels.
33 Section 36-9-101 of the Wyoming statutes authorizes Board of Land Commissioners to
sell state trust land so long as to ‘‘realize a clear long-term beneﬁt to the trust which
substantially exceeds the present and probable future beneﬁt from continued ownership.’’
34 For example, public auctions sales for the state-wide model resulted in land selling for
an average of $45 less per acre for arms-length negotiated sales (see Exhibit 7). Also,
school trust lands, where public access is nonexistent or very costly to obtain, under
current management policy may sell at substantial discounts in price as compared to
prices determined in this study. Since only the farmer or rancher whose property may
surround the land would have incentive to place a bid, other controls must be put in
place to counter this monopoly situation.
35 One possible solution that would address both the current and future needs of the trust’s
beneﬁciaries would be to place a cap on the market value of land held by the state trust
fund. When the value of the trust lands exceeds the cap (which could be indexed for
inﬂation), for example $2 billion, trust land would be reviewed for sale. A policy such
as this would allow the trust to continue growing over time, while increasing the size
of the investment pool as the value of the land appreciated, thus increasing the income
available for distribution each year.A Relationship of Trust  369
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36 Continuing to lease the least valuable land may be the best alternative. These lands will
generate the highest returns based on market values given the current leasing policy.
Also, the highest and best use of these lands probably is for grazing. On the other hand,
farmers or ranchers may desire to purchase the least valuable trust lands because it may
be within the boundaries of their farms or ranches and values would depend mostly on
productivity. From the farmers’ or ranchers’ perspective, these properties may represent
the most operationally viable investment.
37 In the situation that a section is land locked, private land owners are under no obligation
to grant a right-of-way easement; in situations where a lease holder’s parcel is land
locked, it can take a costly and time consuming battle to gain a right-of-way easement
(Sunderman, Spahr and Kunkle, 2002).
38 In this situation, the state could purchase the land from the school trust or operate these
recreational areas on a fee basis.
39 By assuming the market value of school trust lands are comparable to the value of other
privately owned adjacent lands, the hedonic approach has already included capitalized
tax liabilities in land values. Because of the capitalized tax liabilities, land values are
lower and school trust lands would sell at a lower value than if the liability did not
exist. Thus, not including new taxes would exclude the new marginal cash ﬂow, beneﬁts,
accruing to the state and counties.
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